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No Voice, No Choice: Community Group Involvement
in London's Metropolitan Strategic Planning Process
Judith Allen
London's increasingly expensive land market has intensified demands on commerical and residential land both within
and outside the city center. These demands have greatly affected the poor and working class. Recognizing that the
current planning structure does not adequately address the needs of these groups, the Greater London Council in 1981
developed the Community Areas Policy, a metropolitan strategic planning initiative to involve them. The impacts of
its efforts challenged the traditional planning structure, and in 1986 the GLC was dissolved.
Introduction
The struggles during the late nineteenth century for
local democratic governments which would address the
needs of all citizens illustrates one common origin of town
planning in both Britain and America. However, the way
planning has subsequently been institutionalized in both
countries makes it difficult to meet these aspirations. In
practice, planning is characterized by an internal tension
between aspirations for justice and the need for a rational
urban property market demanded by the development in-
dustry. Sometimes these two interests coincide, but the
speculative nature of much urban property development
means that they more often conflict.
Between 1981 and 1986, the last elected administration
at the Greater London Council (GLC) addressed these con-
flicts directly in a radically new approach to metropolitan
strategic planning, as part of a general libertarian political
program aimed at empowering specific groups within
London. The program initially focused on the unem-
ployed, women, and ethnic minorities and was extended
to a wider range of groups during the period of office.
Charismatic leadership, and a budget which made it the
"fourteenth largest nation-state in the world," meant that
the GLC had the resources to pursue these political com-
mitments. It is commonly believed that the GLC's effec-
tiveness in mobilizing these groups threatened the con-
servative central government and was the political source
for national legislation abolishing not only the GLC, but
the six other metropolitan governments in England in
1986.
This article outlines some of the ways in which the
GLC's radical political program changed the practice of
metropolitan strategic planning in London. In particular,
it identifies how these changes in strategic planning pro-
cesses represented a significant challenge to the conven-
tional wisdom in British planning.
The Context: London's Land Market
The speculative land market in London is extremely
buoyant. Office-space rents in central London, for exam-
ple, are higher than in any other city in western Europe.
The buoyancy of the land market is supported by high
levels of direct investment by the central government in
urban regeneration programs which promote and support
speculative commercial development. At the same time,
deregulation of the stock exchange has placed London on
a level with Tokyo and New York in the world financial
market, leading to an explosion of demand for large
(35,000 square foot) trading floors. This need is largely
being met through new development.
London generally has a "traditional" urban structure,
in which poorer working class residential areas surround
the central commercial area. Consequently, the effects of
enhanced commercial land speculation in the center spread
rapidly throughout inner London. The demand for com-
mercial development has also intensified demand for inner
city luxury housing, and the price of residential land here
now exceeds that for commercial uses outside the central
core. Within the British planning system, increased hous-
ing demand is far more difficult to manage than commer-
cial demand, since the system basically controls changes
between land uses, and not within any one use.
The Community Areas Policy
This analysis of the speculative land market in central
London informed the way the GLC's general political pro-
gram was interpreted in metropolitan strategic planning.
The Community Areas Policy, a set of linked initiatives
directly supporting communities threatened by commer-
cial development, formed the centerpiece of the strategy
Fourteen local areas surrounding central London were
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designated as "community areas." Within these areas, a
wide range of groups could apply for capital grants to
develop a variety of social and community facilities.
Directing the money through community groups, rather
than relying on direct public sector investment, was a
major innovation in British planning.
Coupled with revenue support for community workers,
the grants visibly linked the day-to-day concerns of com-
munity groups with wider planning objectives, thereby
supporting the groups' participation in the revision of the
metropolitan strategic plan. Thus, the grants helped coun-
teract the tendency for participation to be dominated by
metropolitan-wide interest groups and middle class
"amenity groups."
Revising the Strategic Plan
The Community Areas Policy was further developed
at the strategic level in the context of revising the Greater
London Development Plan (GLDP), which was seriously
out of date by 1981. A radical view of metropolitan plan-
ning generally informed the revisions, and the very high
priority given to the Community Areas Policy strongly
influenced specific policy changes.
Other innovative policy changes arose from the GLCs
commitment to the development of planning policies rele-
vant to all the groups included within its general political
program. As with the Community Areas Policy, the plan-
ning work was facilitated by grants and broader policy
programs directly supporting these groups. Much of the
participation program associated with the revisions was
organized around these groups, contrasting with tradi-
tional approaches which reflect either specific land uses
or spatial subareas. At the same time, the "spatial visions"
expressed in the revised GLDP grew out of this socially-
based approach.
Thus, the strategic planning process as a whole was
strongly integrated into the GLCs general political program.
Challenging Conventional Wisdom in
Metropolitan Strategic Planning
Conventional wisdom arises out of a set of interlock-
ing factors. By and large, it reflects what is feasible within
a particular administrative structure, set of professional
interests, broader political environment and social struc-
ture. These views then become embedded in the personal
attitudes, values and approaches of members of the polit-
ical system. The processes which institutionalize conven-
tional wisdom become self-reinforcing and obscure the
possibility of developing radically new approaches to meet
wider social objectives.
It is significant, then, that the radical innovations in
metropolitan strategic planning implemented by the last
GLC administration had their roots outside the formal
structure of the GLC and in the planning section of the
1981 London Labour Party manifesto. The process of writ-
ing the manifesto had been highly consultative, and was
based on the London Labour Party's need to build a new
electoral coalition in response to changes in the demo-
graphic composition of London. This coalition was largely
built on addressing the needs of specific, but already
relatively well-organized groups in London— the unem-
ployed, women, and ethnic minorities. "Community
groups" in London pushed their demands within this
broader context, and the manifesto's planning commit-
ments reflect the high level of politicization of "local
planning" issues which had characterized the 1970s. The
manifesto did, however, address for the first time the
strategic dimension of these demands. The manifesto out-
lined the general political program of the last GLC ad-
ministration and provided a broad framework for a radical
approach to metropolitan strategic planning. A new kind
of planning process was developed which emphasized five
strategies focusing on key problems, immediate implemen-
tation, direct implementation, containing commercial
development, and legislative barriers. This new process
challenged the conventional wisdom about metropolitan
strategic planning in ways that were not predicted in 1981.
Key Problems
The last GLC administration saw planning as focused
on solving specific, immediate key problems. This raises
the questions, "whose problems?" and more importantly,
"who must be satisfied with the solutions?" These are
political questions, and the answers were clear within the
general political program of the administration. The clar-
ity of the subsequent links between specific social groups,
their problems, political support and planning policies
facilitated widespread participation in metropolitan
strategic planning.
The strategic planning approach which emerged from
this process did not aim to be comprehensive, but it did
aim to be comprehensible to the groups whose needs
formed its basis. It consequently exposed the way com-
prehensive planning obscures effective political priorities.
In contrast, the conventional wisdom in Britain sees the
planning system as one of "plan-making plus the control
of development." Because all proposed changes in the use
of land require specific planning permission, the plan-
making process is dominated by designing a set of criteria
against which specific planning applications will be
judged.
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The "development control dominated" planning process
generally has only very attenuated ideas about a desirable
future pattern of land uses; this is all that is practicable
where virtually all development is undertaken by the
private sector. The overall pattern of land uses emerges
from the application of these rules over a substantial
period of time. Moreover, the land use pattern is to some
extent unpredictable, depending on developers' decisions
about which sites to develop and how to develop them
most profitably. In the face of severe restrictions on public
expenditure, public infrastructure investment tends to be
dominated by private sector development decisions. In the
process, investment in community facilities "gets lost." As
a consequence, it is often argued that the main function
of this type of planning is to remove key aspects of uncer-
tainty from competition among developers.
The "development control dominated" approach to writ-
ing plans also leads to unfocused and ambiguous plan
documents, since the planners attempt to anticipate all
possible problems and considerations in the early stages
of plan development. Such comprehensive plans are in-
comprehensible to all but the professionally initiated. The
mystifying planning process then inhibits participation.
The City of London across the river Thames.
Planned Action "Now!"
The incoming Labour administration was committed
to coming up with speedy answers to the key problems.
The GLC was politically marginal. The fact that control
alternated between the Labour and Tory parties at vir-
tually every election clearly challenged the conventional
wisdom that metropolitan strategic planning should be
long-term in orientation. The GLC felt it was absurd to
wait 20 to 25 years for solutions to the urgent problems
of today, especially when they knew that the next elected
administration would reverse many of their key policies.
The commitment to planned action "now!" required de-
veloping strategic policies which could be implemented
immediately. The Community Areas Policy exemplified
this approach.
Direct Implementation
The GLC was committed to directly implementing its
own plan. Metropolitan government in London was a
"two tier" system. The GLC was responsible for providing
a strategic planning framework within which the 33 sec-
ond-tier boroughs could pursue locally adapted planning
policies, as long as they were consistent with the GLDP.
Boroughs thus held the main development control powers
and were also free to develop formal local plans. The local
government and planning system operated under the as-
sumption that the bulk of public sector investment, out-
side of major metropolitan roads investment, would be
undertaken by the boroughs. The GLC retained residual
development control powers, mainly over very large
developments and development affecting metropolitan
roads. It also maintained a large public sector home-
building program.
The division of responsibilities within the system was
fairly sensible in a period of expanding public sector
expenditure and relative political consensus over the use
of public sector investment. Nevertheless, strong political
divisions between inner and outer London always limited
access to land and housing to solve inner London prob-
lems. From the mid-1970s on, fiscal crises in the inner
London boroughs enhanced the importance of direct GLC
investment, but there was substantial disagreement over
whether to discourage speculative development in central
London. Some of the inner boroughs were desperate for
the increased property tax revenue generated by commer-
cial development.
Thus, the GLCs commitment to the Community Areas
Policy— interpreted as "no go" areas for commercial
development— was not merely contentious; it could not
be fully implemented without the cooperation of the bor-
oughs. The grants program was welcomed by the boroughs,
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because they could not afford to invest in community
facilities themselves. More importantly the grants raised
significant community opposition to commercial develop-
ment within these boroughs. Thus, the commitment to
direct implementation by the GLC challenged an un-
spoken assumption, written into the very structure of
London government, that the GLC would not become
directly politically involved in "local" or borough plan-
ning issues.
Commercial Development
The last administration at the GLC was primarily con-
cerned with the detrimental consequences of commercial
development on inner London communities. The conven-
tional wisdom of metropolitan strategic planning in the
sixties and seventies emphasized organizing a broad pat-
tern of land uses to facilitate private sector development
by designating areas for future development. Within this
context, the GLDP provided a framework for coordinating
public sector infrastructure investment with private sec-
tor development.
The revised GLDP proposed a tightly drawn Central
Activities Zone, within which commercial development
would be contained. This zone was surrounded entirely
by a Community Areas Ring, in which commercial de-
velopment was largely prohibited. The administration
accepted that this policy would increase land prices within
the Central Activities Zone, and lead to increased specu-
lative pressures around its boundary. Nevertheless, they
argued that strong and clear strategic policies would
facilitate control over these pressures. This strategic view
of the relationship between the land market and planning
policies underpinned more detailed policies throughout
the plan.
Legislative Barriers
The final challenge to the accepted planning practice
was of a different order. Revising the GLDP to meet the
GLCs political objectives exposed many of the detailed
ways that the institutional and legislative framework for
planning facilitates the interests of developers as a group,
while failing to provide protection for those who bear the
social costs of development. By the time the GLC was
abolished, work on a new legislative framework for plan-
ning was proposed and this concept gained momentum
up to the general election in 1987.
By attempting to meet four apparently simple demands
on metropolitan strategic planning, the GLC fundamen-
tally questioned the conventional wisdom written into the
legal and administrative framework for metropolitan
strategic planning.
Increasing land values prompted British Rail to sell these flats for rehabili-
tation and owner-occupation at prices far beyond the means of the local
population.
It is important to realize that these basic challenges to
the conventional wisdom would not have led to a radi-
cially different kind of plan and planning process if they
had not been closely linked with wider practical initiatives
enabling broader general political participation in London.
The next section examines the way this wider context
affected participation in the metropolitan strategic plan-
ning process.
Challenging Cynicism: participation in
metropolitan strategic planning
Organizing effective participation in metropolitan stra-
tegic planning is difficult at the best of times. During a
period of economic recession, it becomes an even more
challenging endeavor.
Three interrelated problems inhibit involvement by dis-
empowered groups. First, their knowledge of London
tends to be localized, reflecting spatially restricted access
to housing, jobs and transportation. Second, particularly
in a time of economic crisis, problems such as unemploy-
ment, inadequate housing, maintaining a household and
raising children are of more immediate concern than
commenting on issues about the long-range quality of life
throughout the metropolitan area. Finally, the generally
legalistic and bureaucratic ways of planning inhibit those
who are uncertain, inarticulate and those who have been
socialized to accept that they have no choice but to
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acquiesce to the vagaries and whims of those with power,
money or education.
Even at the best of times, participation at the metro-
politan level tends to mobilize groups with a clear metro-
politan-wide interest. In London, the roads lobby and
private developers have always been prominent. Economic
recession enhances their interest in planning as they try
to increase their access to scarce resources. With access
to resources to pursue their interests, these lobbyists can
easily obscure the interests of less powerful groups. In this
situation, planners are often left to defend the disem-
powered with very little political support and within an
administrative framework which enjoins them to be
"politically neutral."
SELL
elected members and the public The GLC's political
marginality further reinforced these processes, as plan-
ners avoided implementing policies which were politically
contentious in order to avoid undoing their own work
after the subsequent election.
Personal cynicism results from the placement of polit-
ical administration within a broader social structure. It
is not the result of the (in)competence or apathy of indi-
viduals, but rather the limits on what individuals can
achieve within the broader system. The final administra-
tion at the GLC expanded these limits by developing the
planning participation process within a general political
strategy which addressed social structural issues. This





Residents of Lambeth Borough protest office and hotel development and advocate housing.
This critique of planning participation is well known.
However, without considerable political and administra-
tive resources, individual planners are powerless to cor-
rect it. In practice, planners have responded to these
problems with a deep cynicism, reflecting an attempt to
maintain their democratic aspirations within an institu-
tional framework which frustrates their achievement.
Narrowly conceived "professional interests" often rein-
force this cynicism. Making planning a technical exercise
enhances the power of professional planners within polit-
ical administrative systems, usually to the detriment of
among planning officers for participation, and involved
previously excluded groups in the participation process.
As a result, the extensive direct contact between officers
and members of these groups mobilized officers' profes-
sional commitments to fair, just and democratic planning,
and helped them overcome much of their cynicism.
The lessons that one can learn from this experience can
usefully be analyzed in terms of the ways that narrow pro-
fessional interests interact with personal cynicism to
distort the participation process. The most direct way to
do this is to reformulate four questions that cynical plan-
ners often ask about participation.
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Willingness to Participate
The first question cynical planners ask is: "Are people
willing and able to participate?" The experience of the GLC
poses a far more disturbing question: "Is the local author-
ity willing and able to participate?"
Three aspects of the GLC's participation program sup-
port this reformulation. First, the program was based on
direct consultation with the specific social groups included
in the GLC's general political strategy. These groups were
in a position to respond positively and creatively because
they were supported by broader grants and policy pro-
grams. Second, groups were encouraged to talk about
their general concerns very early on in the planning pro-
cess and were not restricted to simply commenting on
"planning matters" as defined by planners. These general
discussions often originated in policy work outside of the
planning department and provided an important basis for
developing specific planning policies addressing broader
concerns. For example, the women's unit in the director
general's department identified a series of specific plan-
ning problems associated with setting up women's centers
as part of their general grants and policy work. Finally,
the speed of the planning process itself generated a
momentum which sustained interest in participation. In
these ways the general political strategy of the GLC sup-
ported a planning participation process which led to
innovative planning policies specifically addressing an
increased scope of issues and problems for a wide range
of disempowered groups.
Representation
Second, cynical planners ask: "Are local organizations
representative of the urban poor?" The experience of the
GLC's political commitment to specific social groups
exposes the fallacy in the way this question is posed and
suggests that it should be rephrased: "Is the local authority
representative of the urban poor?"
In general, the narrow pursuit of professional interests
within political administrative systems succeeds partly
because it neglects to analyze the mobilization of bias
within interlocking political, electoral, administrative and
technical processes. This silence reinforces cynicism about
participation, because it implicitly denies the existence of
alternatives.
The GLC deliberately sought to mobilize bias in favor
of disempowered groups. Paticipants in the metropolitan
strategic planning process clearly derived their credentials
and legitimacy from these broader political and demo-
cratic processes, not from the technical and professional
preoccupations — or even aspirations — of planners. With-
out this strong political commitment, very little would
have changed.
Organization
Third, cynical planners ask, "how should participation
be organized?" Usually they mean, "should we use ques-
tionnaires, postal surveys, public meetings or exhibitions?"
The experience at the GLC shows that the question must
be linked to political and social organization generally,
and the techniques used must support, and not under-
mine, broader social organization. Thus, the question can
be reformulated: "How does the participation process fit
into the wider social organization of the area?"
The GLC's participation exercise was based on clear
political answers to this question. As a result, the single
most effective, positive, and creative public meeting on
the GLDP revisions was the women's meeting. Two hun-
dred and fifty women packed a county hall conference
room, and spent an evening enthusiastically talking about
the variety of ways in which planning could help them.
The success of this meeting ensured that women's issues
were integrated throughout the revised GLDP. In contrast,
later meetings organized around specific land use topics
were desultory.
The GLC also developed a number of technical innova-
tions. Meetings were tape recorded and oral comments
were generally accepted as formal submissions. Copies of
drafts of the plan, with people's own marginal comments,
were also accepted. Small discussion groups were carefully
planned to ensure that articulate members of community
groups were present to encourage the less articulate to
criticize the successive drafts. Meetings were chaired by
people who were not part of the GLC, and politicians and
senior officers rarely spoke at these meetings. Platforms
were carefully balanced to demonstrate the GLC's com-
mitment to particular groups. Documents were under-
standable, and available in a variety of languages.
It is necessary to explicitly design participation methods
which provide details of the needs of specific social
groups. Failure to develop this sort of approach suggests
political failure, rather than the lack of appropriate
techniques.
Data
Fourth, cynical planners ask, "what data is needed for
planning and how is it to be collected?" The pursuit of
professional interests suggests that answering this ques-
tion is part of the planner's technical expertise. However,
rephrasing the question illustrates its relation to partici-
pation: "What demands are being expressed through
participation and what new data sources may be needed?"
Two examples from the Community Areas Policy show
why rephrasing the question in this way is important. The
first example relates to "creeping conversions"; that is,
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77ie Community-based Coin Street Group is developing 56 new houses and flats.
changes of land use without planning permission. Creep-
ing conversions can have substantial and irreversible
impacts on small areas over very short periods of time.
Planners usually rely on administrative records of per-
mit applications to determine trends in current demand
for particular land uses. Only after community groups
persistently pointed out creeping conversions did GLC
planners admit that land uses could change without plan-
ners' permission and begin to develop policies to tackle
the problem.
The second example comes from the Community Areas
grants program. After the first request for applications
produced a totally unexpected flood of responses, one of
the program administrators remarked, "I've been a plan-
ner for twenty years. I've always been told that it's part
of my professional expertise to know what the community
wants. Looking at these applications now, I know for the
first time in my career what the community wants." The
grants program enabled people to say in real and prac-
tical terms what they needed. Many of the groups who
applied for grants would never have participated in a
formal planning participation exercise, but their views
about what they needed were integrated into the metro-
politan strategic planning process from the beginning
through the grants program.
The GLCs planning participation exercise, because it
was set within the context of a general program of political
participation, brought to light how planners' cynicism
about participation is a consequence of power relation-
ships in broader social and political structures. More
importantly, it showed some of the ways that planning
participation exercises can contribute to or modify these
relationships.
Conclusion
The last GLC administration demonstrated not only
how metropolitan strategic planning and public participa-
tion can be closely linked, but also how each is further
linked to wider political and democratic processes. By
developing an "alternative practice" which explicitly ad-
dressed questions of powerlessness within the wider urban
society of London, the GLC exposed the ways in which
"conventional" planning practice obscures power rela-
tionships.
The lasting legacy of the last GLC administration is not
merely just that it provides a critique of "normal" or ac-
cepted planning practice. It also provides a way of think-
ing about planning practice which allows us to begin to
develop equally creative and positive approaches in other
political and social circumstances.
Many of the people associated with the last GLC ad-
ministration currently feel tired and disappointed. But
they do not feel that their efforts were wasted. To move
so close to a vision of fair, just and democratic planning,
to see what is involved in progressive social and political
change, and to begin to understand how local authority
planning can contribute to this change are inspiring. In-
deed, many of the lessons learned from this experience
have been adopted elsewhere in British planning. By giv-
ing an effective voice to disempowered social groups, the
GLC showed that the structure of power within a society
can be a matter of social choice.
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